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Abstract
The disclosure of the Spectre speculative-execution attacks in
January 2018 has left a severe vulnerability that systems are
still struggling with how to patch. The solutions that currently
exist tend to have incomplete coverage, perform badly, or
have highly undesirable edge cases that cause application
domains to break.
MuonTrap allows processors to continue to speculate,
avoiding significant reductions in performance, without im-
pacting security. We instead prevent the propagation of any
state based on speculative execution, by placing the results of
speculative cache accesses into a small, fast L0 filter cache,
that is non-inclusive, non-exclusive with the rest of the cache
hierarchy. This isolates all parts of the system that can’t be
quickly cleared on any change in threat domain.
MuonTrap uses these speculative filter caches, which are
cleared on context and protection-domain switches, along
with a series of extensions to the cache coherence proto-
col and prefetcher. This renders systems immune to cross-
domain information leakage via Spectre and a host of similar
attacks based on speculative execution, with low performance
impact and few changes to the CPU design.
1 Introduction
Speculative side-channel attacks, such as Spectre [27] and
Meltdown [31] have caused significant concern. While side
channels, where secret data is leaked through unintended
media to an attacker, have been well known and exploited
previously [13, 18, 33], the wide applicability of the newer
speculative attacks [27, 31, 41] even to programs that are oth-
erwise correct, the difficulty of fixing these side channels in
software, and the high bitrates achievable through these spec-
ulative side channels, have resulted in a particular pressing
need for good hardware solutions to remove the problem.
The community is still grappling with how to deal with
balancing the desire for performance, achieved through out-
of-order execution and the relaxed microarchitectural guaran-
tees it requires, against security properties only enforceable
through in-order execution. Current software fixes [1, 38, 42]
either limit performance significantly, have limited coverage,
or require security knowledge by the programmer. Existing
solutions in hardware include restricting instructions that de-
pend on speculative loads [9, 44, 46], which can work well
for many compute-bound workloads but causes other work-
loads to suffer significant degradation. Other techniques [45]
replay memory accesses at commit time, reducing through-
put.
We argue that permitting the microarchitecture to continue
speculating broadly on loads, which is necessary for the high
performance of modern processors, must be a factor in any
solution to speculative-execution attacks. We instead add in
limited hardware regions where speculative hardware state
can be observed, which can be cleared when there is potential
for access by an attacker. We design a speculative filter
cache [23], which disallows propagation of speculative state
into the rest of the system, including indirectly through the
cache coherence protocol or prefetcher, preventing Spectre-
like attacks between victim and attacker on a system. This
prevents leakage of information outside a protection domain,
yet can be reused by many different actors on the same system
with mutual distrust of each other. Once a memory access
becomes non-speculative its data can be placed safely in the
main cache hierarchy. However, if the loads that accessed
the data are squashed, a cache line can remain securely in the
filter cache until replaced via normal cache operation.
MuonTrap, our modest addition to a conventional out-
of-order superscalar CPU, removes cache side-channels ex-
ploitable for speculative attacks, at low overheads (4% slow-
down for SPEC CPU2006, and 5% speedup for Parsec).
2 Background
Speculative side-channel attacks are possible because of a
number of features of modern systems working together to
create a vulnerability. We consider these here before describ-
ing currently implemented attacks in detail.
2.1 Out-of-order Execution
Almost all modern processors use some form of specula-
tion when executing programs. While this cannot affect the
programmer’s model, which should perform as though in-
structions are executed in-order, this does not prevent soft
state such as in caches from being impacted by this execution.
While fetching and decoding of instructions is typically
performed in order of the (speculative) program stream, their
execution may be allowed to occur out-of-order, before then
being retired in true program order. In an aggressively out-
of-order core, if the data used by an instruction for a branch
misses in the cache memory system, and the direction or
target of that branch is mispredicted, then this misprediction
may cause a large number of future, incorrect instructions to
be executed before being thrown away.
This is important when hardware state can be impacted by
the loading of secret data. If this secret data can be used as
input to other instructions, we can indirectly leak it even if
only accessed speculatively. This is particularly harmful on
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Requirements Shared cache between attacker and victim
Vector Attacker brings in data into the cache (1), fol-
lowed by the victim being tricked into loading a secret
value under speculation (2), followed by a second load
based on the contents of the first, which will or won’t evict
the primed data (3) depending on the secret’s value.
Attack 1: Spectre Prime and Probe Attack
out-of-order processors, as they allow multiple instructions
to reach execute before a mis-speculation is corrected.
2.2 Timing Side Channels
Side channels within a processor are a well-studied prob-
lem [12, 13, 16, 18, 28, 33, 35]. If execution on secret data
can affect some indirectly visible property of the system, such
as timing, then information about that data can be leaked with-
out an attacker being able to directly access it. If we repeat
this attack multiple times under different input scenarios, we
may be able to leak the entire data item.
A particularly useful side channel is the memory system
and its caches [27, 31, 32]. Both the existence and non-
existence of data in a cache can be used as a side channel:
though the presence of cache data is not typically part of
the programmer’s model, by timing accesses we can observe
information. For example, by priming a direct-mapped cache
with known data items, then allowing another process to load
an address based on secret data, we can infer which element
was evicted, and thus a subset of the loaded address.
Speculative-execution channels are particularly problem-
atic because they allow us to introduce our own timing side
channels into code, or access data that the programming
model states isn’t accessible, and therefore indirectly leak
it. This means that, even if the programmer ensures any re-
gions of code designed to access such data cannot leak timing
information, an attacker can introduce new code to do so.
2.3 Spectre
Spectre [27] uses speculative execution on an out-of-order
processor to leak secret data from a victim process to an
attacker process, or between protection domains within a
process. It does this by tricking the victim into loading secret
data speculatively, then using the result to do a second load
with an address based on this secret. This will evict data
primed by the attacker from the cache, or bring in data shared
between the victim and attacker, previously evicted by the
attacker, whose access can subsequently be timed to leak bits
of information. An example of this is shown in attack 1.
There are two ways in which this attack can break down
system barriers. One is between processes using inter-process
communication: the attacker process can read the victim pro-
cess’s private data using such an attack. Within a process,
in a low-level language such as C, user-space code can read
any other user-space region, and so a Spectre attack to do the
same is needless. However, if we have code in sandboxed
regions, such as Javascript in a browser process, Spectre can
allow the sandboxed code to implicitly read secret data out-
side of this region, unprotected by any kernel-level protection,
and yet still considered harmful to leak into the sandbox.
3 Requirements and Threat Model
We seek to remove side channels introduced by the specula-
tion, by moving speculative state into structures that can be
cleared when necessary. Rather than preventing the use of
any speculated or misspeculated state, much of which is both
entirely innocuous and useful for performance, we instead
consider it valuable to focus on a more precise threat model.
We consider cache state affected by speculative execution to
be vulnerable if either a) a separate process is able to read
information from it, or b) in processes featuring untrusted
code running in sandboxes (typically browsers), sandboxed
code can observe speculatively accessed data from outside
the sandboxed region but still within the process.
This means that a user can potentially see metadata from
their own speculative execution, but other attackers cannot.
An attacker is still, therefore, able to observe speculative
execution by a victim if they can also trick the victim into
timing a non-speculative access to the cache side channel the
attacker has created before a context switch. We assume that
an attacker only has arbitrary control over a victim’s spec-
ulative execution, and so such attacks cannot be executed.
Further, we are only interested in speculative side channels,
rather than arbitrary covert channels—if the victim intention-
ally tries to send the attacker data, it will still be able to do
so (for example, by deliberately affecting the timing of its
own committed execution). By making this simplification,
we can allow the victim to observe timing characteristics
of its own speculative execution, both before and after this
misspeculation is rolled back by the processor.
We only seek to remove speculative side channels from
the memory system itself. In some microarchitectures other
speculative side channels have been demonstrated, such as
the clock when executing Intel AVX instructions [3], but
these attacks do not involve hiding state to be picked up later,
and do not involve potential chains of speculative behaviour,
as is the case with cache loads, and so can be prevented by
preventing soft state changes before speculation is completed.
We assume that protection within a sandbox, to prevent
sandboxed code itself from speculatively reading other data,
is achieved through other means, such as masked bounds
checks on loads and stores [1]. This means we only have
to focus on the more widely applicable and harder to pre-
vent domain-crossing attacks such as between processes or
through code within a sandbox calling code outside of the
sandbox, avoiding slowdown for the vast majority of appli-
cations where sandboxed threat models do not apply, and
avoiding unnecessary hardware overhead where possible.
Filter caches do not preclude the enforcement of stronger
strategies that hide all information about the state of specu-
lative execution that did not commit. But this simple policy
is easy to enforce, does not require close coupling with the
processor’s internal state, covers the most interesting and
widespread threats from Spectre-style attacks, and is permis-
sive in terms of allowing optimisations where possible.
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Figure 1: The architecture of MuonTrap. Filter caches are
added for instructions, data and the TLB, which are cleared
on a context switch, to isolate speculative data from being
used for a speculative side-channel attack. Prefetch commit
channels are added to preserve ordering of loads and stores
without leaking speculative information, while still allowing
larger caches to prefetch on data access.
4 MuonTrap
We prevent speculative execution from leaving a trace that can
be used for side-channel attacks by adding a small, 1-cycle
access L0 cache between the core and the L1 cache, which
is cleared on context switches, kernel entry, and sandbox
entry. We force all speculative memory state to reside in
the L0, meaning that other caches in the memory hierarchy
contain only data that is non-speculative (i.e., it has been
accessed by committed instructions only). We call the L0
cache a speculative filter cache and refer to other caches in
the hierarchy as non-speculative caches.
With MuonTrap, speculative memory accesses propagate
through the conventional cache system, but do not evict data
from non-speculative caches and do not alter data within
them. Data may be copied back to the L1 cache from L0
when a load or store using its cache line commits. Although
speculative data may be evicted from the filter cache before
this point, it must not be written into a non-speculative cache.
To prevent data from escaping, filter caches are flushed on
context switches, and between sandbox movement in pro-
cesses with multiple actors in the same address space (such
as JavaScript in the browser), and optionally on all misspecu-
lation. Adding this small cache increases lookup time in the
L1 cache by one cycle, due to the need to consult the filter
cache before the L1. However, its size means it can be faster
than a conventional L1 cache in an out-of-order superscalar
system, so for memory accesses with high temporal or spatial
locality, we should expect that this system may sometimes
improve performance via hits to the filter cache, as well as
provide security.
In this section we first discuss the specification of and pro-
tection techniques employed in MuonTrap; the next section
considers examples of specific Spectre-like side channels and
how MuonTrap prevents their use. The overall architecture
of our scheme is given in figure 1.
4.1 Filter Cache
We use the filter cache to isolate speculative data from the
existing cache hierarchy, while still providing access to this
data to other speculative instructions to improve performance.
This means that higher levels of cache are not filled upon a
miss (speculative or otherwise); instead this data is brought
directly into the filter cache. Ideally, the filter cache should
Requirements Inclusion or exclusion with shared data
between attacker and victim
Vector Priming the L1 cache (1), followed by loading of
secret data (2), and using that to evict data indirectly from
the L1 by using inclusion (3) or exclusion with shared data
Defense Non-exclusive, non-inclusive filter cache
Attack 2: Inclusion-Policy Attack
be large enough to store the volume of speculative data that
exists in common execution traces (i.e., for the maximum
likely number of speculative loads and stores in the load
and store queues, where we assume stores can prefetch cache
lines from memory into the filter cache, but cannot perform an
exclusive read until commit). Otherwise, data will be evicted
from the filter cache before it is committed, and won’t reach
the L1 cache, limiting the temporal locality we can exploit,
as the data must be reloaded on next use.
A speculative filter cache is non-inclusive non-exclusive
with respect to the rest of the system’s caches. To see why,
consider attack 2: we must prevent data brought into a filter
cache from influencing state anywhere else in the system,
and so inclusion and exclusion must both be prohibited. This
means that, as with an exclusive cache, data propagates up the
non-speculative cache hierarchy in reverse. It is brought into
the L0 filter cache, and when committed it is written back out
to the non-speculative L1 (and higher caches in an inclusive
hierarchy), becoming visible to the rest of the system. We
assume that cache-line sizes are the same at all levels of the
cache hierarchy, so data from the filter cache can be used to
fill any other cache. If cache-line sizes differ, the filter cache
must take the size of the largest cache line in the system, and
write through to this cache upon eviction of data.
The filter cache itself is faster than a moderately sized L1,
provided the data is in the filter cache. This is because it is a
small cache that can be virtually tagged and addressed from
the CPU-side, and only ever contains data from one process,
as it is flushed on context switches.
4.2 Cache-Line Commit
We add a committed bit to each filter-cache line, which is
set to zero when a cache line is brought in by a speculative
instruction, or set to one when a cache line is brought in
through a non-speculative instruction. This means that an
uncommitted line (i.e., containing speculative data) will not
be written back to the L1. When memory accesses reach
in-order commit in the out-of-order pipeline, the cache is
accessed and the committed bit for the cache line is set if it is
zero, and the line written through to the L1 cache, regardless
of whether the operation was a read or write. It is left in
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the L0 to improve hit time. This write-through-at-commit
policy increases the performance of cache flushes, since all
data in the filter cache can safely be thrown away at any point
during execution. Data only propagates into non-speculative
caches if an instruction using that data has reached commit in
the out-of-order processor pipeline; that is, if the data would
have been loaded in the absence of speculative execution.
When multiple speculative instructions use the same cache
line, if any commits then the relevant cache line should be
written through to the L1 cache and the L0 line marked as
committed. If the line is no longer in the L0, then it is
requested again from the rest of the memory system, and
brought into the L1. This is because a valid in-order execu-
tion would also have brought this data into the cache, and
so the state should become observable to the rest of the sys-
tem. Even if subsequent instructions using the same line
do not commit, the cache lines that should be in the L1 do
not change, and so an attacker cannot observe any further
information from this.
4.3 Filter-Cache Clearing
A filter cache is cleared upon a context switch, system call
or protection-domain switch, to prevent leakage of data via
its presence or absence within the speculative filter cache
between protection domains. As we need not write back any
data upon a flush in this write-though filter cache, we can
simply invalidate all data to make it invisible in the hierarchy.
We implement cache invalidation efficiently by storing a
valid bit per cache line, in registers separate from the SRAM
cache. On a context switch, rather than having to access every
SRAM block, which may take as many cycles as there are
cache lines, we can invalidate the entire cache by clearing
every valid bit, which can be performed in parallel within
a single cycle. On lookup, any cache line with the valid bit
unset is ignored in the filter cache. This is unconventional
for caches, which normally store validity implicitly using
coherency state in SRAM, but is necessary for fast invalida-
tion of the cache, and the extra state is feasible considering
the small size of a filter cache. It is this fast invalidate that
requires the filter cache to be write-through.
Note that we do not flush the filter cache on mispredicted
branches. This is because many applications make use of data
loaded in on mispredictions to improve performance, as such
branches are likely to be taken in the future. Since this does
not cause cache-timing leakages to other protection domains,
we leave this data in the filter cache except from on context
switches, system calls or other protection-domain switches,
when all committed and uncommitted data is cleared.
4.4 Addressing
The filter cache is accessible in a single cycle, so it is desir-
able to avoid virtual-address translation on access. Clearing
it on a context switch avoids aliasing between different phys-
ical addresses for shared virtual addresses across multiple
processes. However, the filter cache must be checked by the
cache-coherence logic, so it must be possible to index it by
physical address. We therefore tag each entry with both the
virtual and physical address of the data and index the cache
by the shared least significant bits of both. This means it is
virtually indexed from the CPU side and physically indexed
from the memory side, to avoid translation. We also prevent
Figure 2: A filter cache can have shared access to any data
in caches on the linear path to memory, and any data in
shared state in private caches, but not data in modified or
exclusive in other parts of the hierarchy. This lets the filter
cache speculatively read the data without affecting any non-
speculative coherence states or viewing the contents of other
filter caches.
Store X  (S→M)
Load X  (I→S)
✗
Attacker Victim
Load X  (I→E)1
2
4
Load Y
3
Requirements Shared data between the attacker and vic-
tim, with write access for the attacker, or ability for the
victim to perform speculative prefetching in the exclusive
state or issue speculative-write coherency requests [41]
Vector Priming the cache (1) with a load, followed by
tricking the victim into loading a secret (2) and using that
to trigger a load (3) or store attempt [41], increasing the
time taken for the attacker to perform a store (4)
Defense Reduced coherency speculation
Attack 3: Shared-Data Attack
virtual-address aliasing within a process by physically ad-
dressing upon a memory fill, which may overwrite an alias
with a different virtual address but ensures that only one copy
of each physical address exists at a time in the filter cache.
4.5 Coherency Mechanism
Filter caches can only participate in the cache coherence
protocol in a way that cannot be timed by non-speculative
caches, does not affect the state of any non-speculative caches,
and does not influence the behaviour of other filter caches
in the system. To achieve this, using the MESI protocol, we
allow any filter cache to hold a copy of some data in shared
(S), provided that this data is only in an exclusive (E) or
modified (M) state in a non-speculative cache nearer, and on
a direct path to, main memory, or no non-speculative cache
has a copy in E or M state. This is exemplified in figure 2.
Upgrades from S, when a load or store is written through
to the L1, can only occur once the associated instruction is
non-speculative, and must invalidate any other filter cache
that may have a copy under this policy in a constant-time
operation.
What follows is that, if data is held in a non-shared way in
a cache that is private to another part of the hierarchy, then
speculative accesses must wait to access the data until they
become non-speculative. Likewise, for all filter caches to
work independently and not leak speculative information to
each other, filter caches cannot enter non-shared states.
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Load X  (I→I)
Load X  (I→E)
Delay X  (I→S) ✗
Attacker Victim
1
4
5
Load Z  (I→E)3
Load Y
2
Requirements Filter cache with reduced coherency spec-
ulation, and shared data between the attacker and victim
Vector Speculative load access by the victim to secret
data (1) used to trigger an access to shared data (2). This
is followed by a load to an address the attacker knows
will miss (3) causing a load to the same address accessed
speculatively by the victim (4) to be delayed (5)
Defense Loading into the filter cache as shared, with
asynchronous upgrade at commit (for performance)
Attack 4: Filter-Cache Coherency Attack
Reduced Coherency Speculation We prevent filter caches
from changing the coherence state of any non-speculative
cache via speculative instructions. If a private cache on a
different part of the hierarchy is in M or E state, then bringing
this data into S state within the filter cache would change the
other cache’s state. By comparison, an access by the filter
cache to main memory, or to a cache closer to memory than
the L0, would not, as any filter cache below this is allowed a
copy of the data. Attack 3 shows an example mechanism.
To prevent such an attack, during speculative execution
we delay any memory access that would cause another pri-
vate cache to move from M or E into S or I, until it is at
the front of the instruction queue, and so will definitely be
executed within the program. Any operation that is affected
by this delay is negatively acknowledged to the requesting
core, which repeats the access when safe. Forward progress
is maintained, as any coherence transaction that reaches the
head of the queue will succeed. As these delays are purely
based on the contents of non-speculative caches, they cannot
leak speculative data.
Filter-Cache State Reduction We further ensure that any
speculative access from one filter cache has independent
timing characteristics from any other, even after commit. This
is by allowing data to only be brought into the filter cache
in Shared state. This means that the presence of data in any
other filter cache is not leaked by the coherence protocol, even
after any relevant instructions commit and are sent into the
non-speculative cache hierarchy, because with this constraint
we only need to check non-speculative caches to move into
the shared state. Indeed, as the filter cache is write-through,
there is no direct need for any states other than shared (S)
and invalid (I) within a filter cache. Without this reduction of
possible states, and associated timing guarantees, then attacks
such as attack 4 would be possible, both before a speculative
load is squashed, and given that filter caches are not flushed
on a misspeculation, after correct execution is restarted.
This could effectively reduce behaviour to MSI, even if
MESI is internally supported, because if we assume all loads
are speculative, no data will ever be brought in to E state.
That said, states such as O and F in MOESI and MESIF will
be used, as instructions entering those states would become
non-speculative. Yet MESI, or more complex protocols, are
typically supported in modern processors for performance
reasons, and so we want to have data in exclusive state when-
ever useful. To achieve this efficiently, we add a new pseudo-
state to the filter cache, SE, which behaves like S to the
coherence protocol, but when the load becomes visible to the
rest of the system, an asynchronous upgrade to the E state is
launched from the L1 cache, similar to a prefetch. From a
functional protocol perspective, this means we add no new
states; an L0 can only take on the S or the I state. A line in
the filter cache is placed in SE when an unprotected system
would have placed it in E in the L1; that is, the data is in
no other private non-speculative cache in the system. The
asynchronous upgrade this triggers at commit invalidates any
copies in the rest of the hierarchy written back since, and in
any filter caches, which remain invisible from timing.
Wider Implications These constraints allow filter caches
to participate in the cache-coherence protocol without any
visible timing effects from speculative execution. This means
that we need not repeat memory accesses, and can store
data brought in by a filter cache immediately into the non-
speculative cache hierarchy. As an effect, a commit of a load
cannot be stalled by any second cache access, unlike in previ-
ous work [45]. Further, it means that memory accesses that
do not require state changes in caches private to other cores
can continue to be arbitrarily speculated and executed in par-
allel, unlike techniques that restrict L1 misses in general [37].
While a speculative store instruction cannot prefetch data into
E state in the filter cache, it can still bring data in from closer
to memory in S state, speeding up the write post-commit.
The cost of allowing filter caches to participate in co-
herency is that upgrades to exclusive or modified must inval-
idate other filter caches in the rare event that the data isn’t
already in an exclusive state within a cache private to the
upgrading core. This broadcast is designed to provide timing
invariance with respect to data in filter caches, which must
be preserved even if a snoop filter is used. Still, this is unnec-
essary in the typical case, where we already have exclusive
access in the L1 cache. More generally, the technique scales
to many-core hierarchies by only requiring multicast to cores
in clusters below a shared cache with exclusive access to the
data, as these are the only filter caches which could currently
store shared copies of the cache line.
MuonTrap does not directly interact with the memory con-
sistency model. All it is allowed to do in this respect is delay
load operations, but this neither makes any particular ordering
stricter nor weaker, and so any commonly-used consistency
model can directly use MuonTrap.
4.6 Prefetching
It is insufficient to hide speculative memory accesses in filter
caches if those accesses can indirectly trigger changes in non-
speculative cache state from prefetches based on them. To see
why, consider attack 5. By bringing in further lines based on
the speculative access, a prefetcher would leak information
to the wider hierarchy. We must therefore trigger prefetches
only based on the committed instruction stream, rather than
speculative accesses. We add a tag to each cache line in the
filter cache, specifying which level of the non-speculative
hierarchy it was brought in from. When a filter-cache line
changes state from uncommitted to committed, a prefetch
notification is then sent to the corresponding level, provided
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Requirements Prefetcher with access to speculative
loads
Vector Priming a cache featuring a prefetcher (1) by the
attacker, followed by loading secret data (2) by the victim,
who then loads an address to trigger the prefetcher to bring
the next line into a non-speculative cache (3)
Defense Prefetch on commit
Attack 5: Prefetcher Attack
Requirements Inst. cache shared by attacker and victim
Vector Priming the instruction cache (1) by the attacker,
followed by loading of secret data (2) and using it to index
into the instruction cache using an indirect branch (3)
Defense Filter cache for instruction access
Attack 6: Instruction-Cache Attack
it has a prefetcher, to avoid triggering unnecessary prefetches
to caches that weren’t accessed.
4.7 Protected Caches
Though this section has so far assumed that the filter cache is
used to protect data-cache loads, this is not the only place in
which a filter cache is needed in a system to prevent specula-
tive side-channel attacks.
Instruction Cache Though the instruction cache was not
used as an attack vector for the original Spectre attack [27],
it is possible to leak speculative information in a similar
manner to attacking the data cache. For example, in attack 6
an attacker can cause a victim process to jump to a memory
location based on the value of secret data, and then infer this
information by timing instruction access. We can fix this side
channel in the same way that we fix the data side channel:
by using a speculative filter cache for instructions in addition
to that for data. This is comparatively simpler because there
is no cache coherency for read-only data, and so we only
need to set the committed bit on committing an instruction,
without issuing any further memory transactions to upgrade
the cache line.
TLBs and Page-Table Walkers Side channels within a
TLB are more difficult to exploit cross-process than on other
caches, as no shared TLB translations will exist. Therefore
attackers are restricted to prime and probe attacks, where they
infer data by causing the victim process to evict translations
placed in the TLB by the attacker. Still, for full protection
we need to prevent eviction of non-speculative entries with
speculative translations, by storing speculative translations in
a filter TLB. On instruction commit, the relevant translations
are moved to a nonspeculative TLB, and the filter TLB is
flushed on a context switch, as with a filter cache.
Hardware page-table walks triggered from speculative in-
structions can write into caches. We must also prevent side
channels through this mechanism. Although we can enforce
that these memory accesses go through a filter cache, working
out when a page-table-walker cache entry should be commit-
ted is complex, as there is no one-to-one correspondence
between executed instructions and page-table entries. Upon
commit, we retranslate any instructions that caused page-
table misses: these entries are likely to be in the filter cache
at this point, and can be written back to the L1 as a result
of the non-speculative retranslation. This allows us to mark
filter-cache elements that should be written through into the
L1, because they were part of valid non-speculative execu-
tion.
4.8 Multicore and SMT
Different cores may have different processes running within
them at any one time, and so each must have a filter cache
to isolate them from each other’s speculative side channels.
Assuming that they are allowed to be from separate processes,
this is also true of multiple threads in a simultaneous multi-
threading arrangement on the same core. Protection of the
filter cache relies on isolating speculative data within the
filter cache from threads from other processes. This necessi-
tates that when multiple processes are run concurrently via
simultaneous multithreading on the same core, they must not
be able to infer filter-cache state about the other, otherwise
information may leak between the two. This means each
thread must similarly have either separate filter caches, or use
partition-based isolation based on the process ID.
4.9 Within-Process Attacks
MuonTrap prevents between-process attacks by clearing the
filter cache on a context switch, and user-kernel attacks by
clearing on syscalls, thus preventing the attacker from learn-
ing any information based on what has or hasn’t been loaded.
However, an attacker may be in the same process as the vic-
tim, executing within a sandbox (if not inside a sandbox, the
attacker already has nonspeculative access to the victim’s
data). We therefore need to clear filter caches on movement
into sandboxed regions. This is performed using a dedicated
flush instruction sat behind a non-speculation barrier [7]. As
a result, speculation barriers only need to be inserted at the
boundaries of sandboxes, rather than throughout the entire
program as is currently necessary. This defense requires that
an attacker can only cause execution outside of the sand-
box by a path terminated with a filter-cache clear. For full
protection against the subset of variant 2 attacks where the
victim is fooled into mistraining its own branch targets by
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an attacker sandbox, branch-target-buffer isolation, as is al-
ready implemented on recent commodity systems[8], is also
necessary. For protection against Spectre 1.1 [25] within
a sandbox, where speculative stores are used to overwrite
return stacks and thus execute code outside the sandbox,
stores within sandbox-interpreted code should be covered
by masked bounds checks [1], and to prevent the sandboxed
code itself from executing Spectre v1 attacks, masked bounds
checks should also be used on sandbox-interpreted loads. By
utilising simple software fixes where applicable, we can avoid
the overheads of hardware mitigation for the vast majority
of applications that are not vulnerable to such attacks, while
covering those which are hardest to fix by using dedicated
hardware.
Still, for applications requiring strong protection properties
of their sandboxes that are not provided in software, we
provide the option to clear-on-misspeculate, on a per-process
granularity. This prevents the timing of a speculative side
channel after execution restarts.
4.10 Remaining Channels
MuonTrap follows a permissive threat model—its main goal
is to prevent speculative side channels between distinct do-
mains, such as process boundaries, rather than arbitrary spec-
ulative side channels. This manifests in multiple ways:
Data Visibility By default, MuonTrap does not clear its
filter caches upon misspeculation, though this can be enabled
per-process. Without this clearing, speculative state in the
filter cache can be observed by the victim themselves after
correct execution is resumed. However, this is not passed on
to attacker-run code, and it allows any data brought in under
normal misspeculation to be reused.
Contention MuonTrap does not allow speculative filter
cache state to affect any non-speculative cache. Their interac-
tion only occurs at commit time, with the results of loads and
stores being written from the filter cache to L1 in program
order, provided new data was brought in. Still, an under-
sized filter cache can have speculative data evicted from it
before commit-time. In this case, the data will be passively
re-loaded from memory or a higher cache level into the L1,
causing transient contention in caches. Since this requires
arbitrary control of both the victim’s committed and spec-
ulative execution, and only causes a transient channel, we
consider it out-of-scope.
Timing Even with clear-on-misspeculate, MuonTrap does
not prevent code that will be committed from observing the
timing behaviour of concurrently running speculative execu-
tion within the same thread [17]. It shares this property with
any techniques that allow wider propagation of speculation
and roll it back [36], but not with those that limit specula-
tion [9, 44, 46]. Still, MuonTrap mitigates by preventing
concurrent execution from multiple threat domains within the
same thread by using barriers and flushes, and by having a
constant-time filter cache flush operation, rather than an undo
that depends on the speculative actions it has performed.
4.11 Summary
To prevent speculative data from being leaked within the
memory system, we have added MuonTrap, an extra layer
of indirection, into the cache hierarchy. This filter cache sits
between each core and the L1 caches to store speculative data
Main cores
Core 8-Wide, out-of-order, 2.0GHz
Pipeline 192-Entry ROB, 64-entry IQ, 32-entry LQ,
32-entry SQ, 256 Int / 256 FP registers, 6
Int ALUs, 4 FP ALUs, 2 Mult/Div ALU
Tournament 2048-Entry local, 8192-entry global,
Branch Pred. 2048-entry chooser, 4096-entry BTB,
16-entry RAS
Private core memory
L1 ICache 32KiB, 2-way, 1-cycle hit lat, 4 MSHRs
L1 DCache 64KiB, 2-way, 2-cycle hit lat, 4 MSHRs
TLBs 64-Entry, fully associative, split between
instructions and data
Data filter cache 2KiB, 4-way, 1-cycle hit lat, 4 MSHRs
Inst filter cache 2KiB, 4-way, 1-cycle hit lat, 4 MSHRs
Shared system state
L2 Cache 2MiB, 8-way, 20-cycle hit lat, 16 MSHRs,
stride prefetcher
Memory DDR3-1600 11-11-11-28 800MHz
OS Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
Core count 4 cores
Table 1: Core and memory experimental setup.
and is cleared on switches of protection domain.
A basic filter cache in front of the L1 data cache, while able
to defend against traditional Spectre attacks, can still allow
information leakage through the cache hierarchy. We must
therefore impose further constraints on the cache coherence
protocol, add filter caches to the TLB system and instruction
cache, and prevent data leakage via the prefetcher, for our
system to be secure against other similar attacks.
5 Experimental Setup
We model a high performance multicore system using the
gem5 simulator [11] with the ARMv8 64-bit instruction set
and configuration given in table 1, similar microarchitec-
turally to systems used in previous Spectre mitigation tech-
niques [45, 46]. The L1 data cache is 2-cycle access, and
the L1 instruction cache 1-cycle: this is because the instruc-
tion cache is typically faster in a modern system [19], as it
can be virtually tagged without aliasing issues. We simu-
late SPEC CPU2006 [20] in syscall emulation mode, fast
forwarding for 1 billion instructions, then running for 1 bil-
lion instructions. We also evaluate on Parsec [10], running
on the simsmall datasets with 4 threads in full-system mode
running Linux. The benchmarks included are the subset that
compile on AArch64, and are run to completion. Results for
the open-source InvisiSpec [45] and STT [46] are reproduced
on the same AArch64 system, using recent patches [4, 5].
6 Evaluation
We first look at overall performance for the whole MuonTrap
technique on SPEC CPU2006 (4% average slowdown) and
Parsec (5% average speedup), before comparing with related
work re-evaluated on the same system [45] and reported in the
literature [46]. Then, we perform a tuning analysis on Parsec,
focusing on cache size and associativity. We finally examine
in detail the overheads from protections for the instruction
cache, coherency protocol and prefetcher, and the optional
clearing of the filter cache on every misspeculation.
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Figure 3: Normalised execution time from MuonTrap, compared with each of the InvisiSpec [45] and STT [46] techniques
running SPEC CPU2006 (lower is better).
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6.1 Performance
In figure 3 we see that execution is slowed down by 4%
on average for SPEC CPU2006 [20] with MuonTrap. Some
workloads (povray, lbm) are sped up by virtue of the faster L0
data-cache access relative to an unprotected system. Others
are hampered by the small filter-cache size (bwaves), low
associativity of the filter cache (cactusADM), the delayed
commit-time prefetch mechanism (leslie3d and libquantum),
the instruction filter cache (omnetpp) or a combination of all
of these factors (zeusmp). The access delay for the L1 cache
from being behind the filter cache also adds some overhead;
geomean slowdown can be reduced further to 2% if access
is allowed in parallel, as we shall later see in figure 9. Still,
for many workloads, the performance impact of all of these
protections is negligible. Lbm is in fact sped up significantly
using a filter cache; the in-order prefetching necessary for
protection against speculative-execution attacks also allows
the prefetcher to better pick up the access pattern in this
workload, dramatically improves performance.
For Parsec on 4 cores (figure 4), despite its protections a
filter cache actually results in a speedup for each workload
(geomean 5%). This is because these parallel workloads are
very amenable to having a small, 1-cycle L0 data cache in
front of a conventional, slower, physically addressed 2-cycle
L1, and the additional costs that clearing on context switches,
on prefetches, on coherence, on evicting uncommitted data
and on instruction fetch are not enough to outweigh this
advantage. This is not the case for SPEC CPU2006, hence
why systems that do not need the security of MuonTrap do
not gain this performance benefit elsewhere.
6.2 Versus InvisiSpec
InvisiSpec [45] is a load-store-queue extension designed for
the same purpose as the filter cache in this paper, in that it
hides speculative execution. However, we see in figure 3
that MuonTrap typically has higher performance than either
of InvisiSpec’s two designs, despite the fact that MuonTrap
also covers the instruction cache and prefetcher. The first
of these (InvisiSpec-Spectre) assumes that data can be made
visible as soon as its speculative load is not dependent on
any unresolved branches, introducing a slowdown of 9.7%.
The second (InvisiSpec-Future) incurs a 18.5% slowdown
when it assumes that data is not safe to become visible until
a load can no longer be squashed. MuonTrap considers an
instruction speculative until it commits, as this reduces hard-
ware implementation complexity. This is close to the threat
model of Invisispec-Future, and we often see performance
spikes on similar workloads (bwaves, leslie3d, zeusmp); the
cases where MuonTrap particularly suffers (cactusADM and
leslie3d) are caused by the prefetcher, which is not protected
by InvisiSpec. However, MuonTrap still achieves lower per-
formance impact than Invisispec-Spectre overall. On Parsec
(figure 4), the up to 2× performance disadvantage of both
InvisiSpec-Spectre and InvisiSpec-Future is eliminated.
InvisiSpec stores cache lines in word-sized load-store log
entries, whereas a MuonTrap speculative filter cache is a true
cache, with cache-line-sized entries. Our technique does not
need to store multiple copies of data when there is temporal
or spatial locality, reducing the amount of SRAM needed for
the same coverage. InvisiSpec accesses do not participate
in the cache coherence protocol at all, and so all loads must
be replayed and potentially reload their data when the in-
struction commits, causing a delay at the end of the pipeline.
Our approach instead keeps filter-cache data coherent, but
prevents data leakage by delaying execution of instructions
that would invalidate other caches with the same data, which
is an uncommon case. A speculative filter cache must issue a
second coherence request to gain exclusive access, much like
the second request in InvisiSpec. However, because a spec-
ulative filter cache is coherent, this does not delay commit,
prevents load instructions from ever having to be re-executed,
and does not require the cache line itself to be reloaded from
the cache hierarchy. This second cache-system access is asyn-
chronous in a speculative filter cache, unlike in InvisiSpec,
improving performance significantly. This coherency does
mean that exclusive upgrades for stores must invalidate filter
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Figure 5: Performance of a fully associative filter cache added
to the system in table 1, with varying size, on Parsec.
caches. However, we see in figure 7 that this is typically a
rare occurrence, as most stores are to data already in private
caches. This trades off an expensive common-case operation
(repeat memory accesses before a load can commit) for a
rarer one (filter-cache broadcasts for a subset of stores).
6.3 Versus STT
Speculative Taint Tracking [46], similar to NDA [44], Condi-
tional Speculation [30] and SpecShield [9], is based on the
policy of restricting the forwarding of speculative load values.
For some compute-bound workloads in SPEC CPU2006 (fig-
ure 3), this adds little overhead. However, those with more
complex memory-access patterns, such as astar and omnetpp,
suffer high performance losses that MuonTrap can alleviate;
on Parsec (figure 4) we see geomean overheads of 18% for
STT-Spectre, and 38% on the less permissive STT-Future,
compared with 5% speedup for MuonTrap.
6.4 Tuning Parameters
We now look at how tuning the parameters of a filter cache
within just the data hierarchy affects performance, using the
Parsec benchmark suite running with 4 threads.
Cache size Figure 5 shows normalised execution time for
Parsec from adding a fully associative filter cache to the sys-
tem at various sizes, normalised to the same system without
any filter cache or associated protections. We see that, for
some benchmarks, even a single cache line (64 bytes) is
enough to get close to the performance of an unprotected
system. This is because these workloads feature either high
spatial and temporal locality, or little memory-level paral-
lelism, and therefore early eviction of cache lines from the
filter cache before they can be committed from execution
is rare. For other workloads, however, particularly stream-
cluster and freqmine, enormous slowdowns are observed
when the filter cache is too small. However, these large slow-
downs disappear for all benchmarks with four cache lines
(256 bytes) of space in the cache or more. This is only a quar-
ter of the number of loads from independent cache lines the
processor we simulate can support (16 load elements), and
yet it is sufficient to the point of producing a minor speedup.
In cases where loads come from many different cache lines
at once, there is little spatial or temporal locality available,
and thus not writing back the data to the L1 does not af-
fect performance. We find that the majority of performance
improvement can be attained with a 2,048 byte filter cache,
giving no slowdown for any benchmark and a speedup of
6.9% on average. For all other experiments, we assume a
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Figure 7: Proportion of writes that trigger filter-cache invali-
dates for SPEC2006 under MuonTrap.
filter cache of this fixed size, which comes at negligible area
overhead compared with the core itself.
Associativity In figure 6, we reduce the full associativity
(32-way) of the 2,048 byte filter cache in figure 5 to show the
performance impact. Some workloads (blackscholes, canneal,
fluidanimate, and streamcluster) can be affected by conflict
misses on filter-cache data before it can be committed, and
written back to the L1 cache. We set the associativity to 4-way
to trade off access complexity compared to full associativity
without reducing performance.
6.5 Cost Breakdown
A filter cache on the core’s data side on its own would be
sufficient to protect against the original Spectre attack [27].
However, to protect against similar attacks on other parts of
the memory system, MuonTrap adds in a variety of further
mechanisms to cover coherency, instructions and prefetching.
We now consider to what extent each of these contributes to
MuonTrap’s overheads. Each of these is already included in
figure 3 and figure 4, but here we split them out for the most
relevant workloads in each case to show the cost of each,
looking at the most affected benchmark suite in each case.
We finally show the further performance of a more intensive
scheme that accesses the data filter cache and L1 in parallel,
providing the potential to eliminate overheads further at the
expense of complexity, which can reduce SPEC CPU2006
overhead from 4% to 2%.
Graphs for these additions are given in figure 8 for Parsec,
and figure 9 for SPEC CPU2006. The following sections add
mitigations successively, comparing the performance.
9
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
blac
ksch
olescann
eal ferre
t
fluidan
imat
e
freqm
ine
strea
mclu
ster
swap
tions
geom
ean
No
rm
al
ise
d 
Ex
ec
 T
im
e
insecure L0
fcache only
coherency
ifcache
prefetching
clear misspec
Figure 8: Normalised execution time from cumulatively
adding protection mechanisms to the system on Parsec, com-
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Filter Cache Protection An insecure L0 cache in place of
the filter cache lowers performance on SPEC compared with
the L1-only baseline, while improving it on Parsec. This is
because workloads such as leslie3d and zeusmp react nega-
tively to the increase in L1 latency, and have low hit rates in
the L0. Meanwhile others, such as bwaves, only suffer once
the filter cache protections are in place, where speculative
state not propagating to the L1 causes performance loss.
Coherence Protection The removal of speculative coher-
ence state changes, described in section 4.5 (coherency in fig-
ure 8) typically have negigible impact on the single-threaded
SPEC workloads, and only a minor impact on the multi-
threaded Parsec workloads. This is because speculative co-
herency state changes to other caches are relatively rare, and
under normal operation a bus transaction takes long enough
that delaying it to make it nonspeculative does not alter perfor-
mance significantly. The upgrades to exclusive from shared
when a load commits have minimal impact on contention
and pipeline execution time, since coherence requests are
already rare, and since they do not block commit as they
can be done asynchronously. The two exceptions to this
are ferret and streamcluster, and even there the speed of the
filter cache outweighs the additional slowdown for limited
coherency speculation. Still, we have seen in figure 7 that
some workloads (bwaves, gcc, lbm, libquantum, mcr and
zeusmp) trigger many write-miss broadcasts, and while we
cannot uniquely isolate this overhead from other filter cache
overheads, we see that several of these workloads do suffer
some performance overhead as a result (figure 9).
Instruction Filter Cache Unlike with the data cache,
adding an instruction filter cache (ifcache in figure 8) rarely
improves performance. This is because the baseline instruc-
tion cache already has a 1-cycle access latency, and so adding
a filter cache has no improvement potential, except for pre-
venting some conflict misses, due to being more associative
than the L1. Indeed, slight performance drops occur with
several benchmarks due to more lines being accessed before
instruction commit than the instruction filter cache can store.
On Parsec (figure 8) this is typically minor, save for fluidani-
mate, but even then the additional overhead is not enough to
cause MuonTrap to lower performance overall. However, for
SPEC CPU2006 (figure 9), we see multiple workloads taking
a minor hit, and namd and sjeng taking a more significant
penalty.
Commit-Time Prefetching Altering prefetching to be per-
formed at commit time (section 4.6, prefetching in figure 8)
instead of immediately after a load has been issued, is a
double-edged sword. While Parsec is minimally affected,
in figure 9 for SPEC CPU2006 we see that while lbm and
bwaves see significant performance improvement, through
better tracking of the load stream without misspeculation,
cactusADM and leslie3d suffer from reduced prefetch timeli-
ness.
Clear on Misspeculation Workloads that require within-
process isolation of user-space sandboxes, and feature no
further software mitigations for this use case, can configure
MuonTrap to flush on all misspeculation. This increases
overheads to 11% for SPEC and 2% on Parsec, as several
workloads make use of both misspeculated data, and old
accesses in the L0.
Parallel L1 and L0 access While Parsec has high perfor-
mance regardless of filter-cache configuration, the 4% slow-
down for SPEC CPU2006 leaves room for improvement.
Even without additional protections, a filter cache alone is
a significant detriment to many workloads simply because
the filter cache cannot be sized large enough to cover any
significant proportion of the working set, meaning that the
additional delay to the L1 cache lowers performance. To
mitigate this, at the expense of complexity, high-performance
systems can be configured to access the 2-cycle L1 non-
speculative cache and 1-cycle L0 filter cache simultaneously.
We see in figure 9 that this can reduce overhead from the 4%
reported in the rest of the paper, down to 2%.
6.6 Summary
MuonTrap fact achieves a 4% slowdown on SPEC CPU2006
(worst case 47%), and a 5% performance improvement on
Parsec, compared to an insecure baseline. Since MuonTrap
typically avoids limiting speculation within a threat domain,
it generally sees overheads lower than existing techniques in
the literature [45, 46]. While mechanisms such as in-order
prefetching do have a performance impact, slowdowns are
still typically small, and can be mitigated further by accessing
filter caches and non-speculative caches in parallel.
7 Related Work
7.1 Speculative Side-Channel Attacks
Spectre [27] allows the leakage of secret information from a
victim process by attacking the branch predictor or poison-
ing the branch target buffer. Meltdown [31] defeats kernel
protections on some out-of-order superscalar processors due
to a speculative side channel caused by not checking permis-
sions on cache fill. Other variants have also been proposed
and implemented, including SpectrePrime [41], which uses
the cache-coherence system as a side channel for the same
exploit. Spectre variants 1.1 and 1.2 [25] exploit the branch
predictor as the attack mechanism but use speculative stores
to shape that execution further, and variant 4 [2] exploits spec-
ulative execution to leak data that should have been zeroed
in program order. As these use cache side channels to leak
data, our protection mechanism prevents their utilisation.
7.2 Current Mitigations
Deployed Mitigations A variety of software mitigations
exist for protecting against some variants of Meltdown and
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Figure 9: Performance from cumulatively adding protection mechanisms on SPEC CPU2006, relative to a filter-cache-free
system.
Spectre. For the former, kernel page-table isolation [38]
can be used to separate out kernel and user-space memory
into separate address spaces, at overheads of up to 30% [38].
Spectre mitigations are also available in software, but as it
is more difficult to protect against, mitigations tend to be
more ad hoc: typically, program recompilation is required,
and coverage is often low. Google’s Retpoline [42] replaces
vulnerable branches with unconditional jumps, to override
the branch-target buffer’s predictor to prevent speculation.
This defends against variant 2 of Spectre on x86, but is inef-
fective for Arm systems [1]. For variant 1, on Arm systems
non-speculative load barriers [7] can be inserted by the pro-
grammer to prevent particularly vulnerable loads from being
exploited, however, this requires security knowledge by the
programmer, reduces performance, and suffers from a lack
of general coverage. LFENCE instructions can be used on
x86 architectures [21] to similar effect, with similar down-
sides. Microcode updates such as Indirect Branch Restricted
Speculation (IBRS) [21] also target variant 2 on Intel ma-
chines, by reducing speculation on kernel entry for indirect
branches, but these cover only a subset of variant 2 exploits.
New Intel [29] and Arm [8] hardware designs feature variant
2 mitigations by isolating the branch-target buffer, preventing
direct training by an attacker, but as variant 1 typically occurs
by causing the victim to train itself, this strategy is of no
benefit for the latter.
Memory Hierarchy InvisiSpec [45], as discussed in sec-
tion 6.2, covers speculative execution by associating load-
store-queue entries with cache lines, and repeating accesses
to bring them into the cache when the instruction becomes
nonspeculative. SafeSpec [22] also stores speculative data
in fully-associative shadow structures attached to the load-
store queue. It requires strict limits on the forwarding of
data to be secure, which also means that it must be signifi-
cantly overprovisioned, and that the same data must be able
to exist multiple times in the same SafeSpec shadow struc-
ture to prevent side channels. The paper does not consider
coherence-protocol attacks, and its structure likely prevents
application of the coherence strategy applied to MuonTrap,
since the invalidation operation is infeasibly expensive on the
large, fully-associative structures necessary for SafeSpec to
work. DAWG [24] uses dynamic partitioning to isolate cache
entries in the absence of shared memory to prevent general
cache side channels, but this is not feasible for cross-process
Spectre attacks, where a large number different processes
may be executing concurrently with mutual distrust.
CleanupSpec [36] allows speculative state to propagate
through the memory system, using rollback techniques to
undo changes to the caches. While this prevents the di-
rect channel from reading the caches once this rollback is
complete, the rollback mechanism is itself timing-dependent
on secrets brought in by an attacker, unlike MuonTrap’s
constant-time invalidation of its filter caches. Likewise, as
CleanupSpec does not clear speculative state between pro-
tection domains, an attacker with code running concurrently
with the victim’s execution, but before it in program order,
can observe state altered by the victim’s execution.
Load-Propagation Restriction SpecShield [9], NDA [44],
Conditional Speculation [30], Sakalis et al. [37] and Specula-
tive Taint Tracking [46] are approaches that restrict various
proportions of instructions dependent on speculative loads.
While this can prevent the installation of secrets within a
wide variety of side-channel mechanisms, and for workloads
such as SPEC CPU2006 can be achieved with minimal slow-
down [9, 46], workloads with more complex memory be-
haviour such as Parsec [46] and SPEC CPU2017 [44] suffer
from the limitations of load restriction regardless of how per-
missive. Taram et al. [40] present context-sensitive fencing,
where memory fences are dynamically inserted into code
streams by the microcode engine, to protect against kernel
attacks.
7.3 Side-Channel Attacks and Prevention
Side channels exist more generally [13, 18, 33] than the
speculative attacks we focus on. In particular, common
cryptographic-algorithm implementations [28, 34] can be
vulnerable to leaking information about their input and se-
cret keys if not designed to be timing independent on their
input data. Related to side channels are covert-channel at-
tacks [12, 35], where two cooperating processes, one at
higher security clearance than the other, modulate a shared
resource to violate a mandatory access-control policy, to leak
information.
It is possible to prevent all side-channel attacks in hard-
ware [14, 32, 43]. However, this involves modification of the
entire cache hierarchy. To prevent speculative side-channel
attacks, it is possible to modify only the level closest to the
CPU, and still achieve strong security properties.
7.4 Filter caches
Caches at the L0 level in a system have been utilised pre-
viously for power and performance [23]. Duong et al. [15]
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use small caches to reduce hit energy and conflict misses in
embedded systems. Tang et al. [39] use small instruction
caches to reduce power consumption. In terms of industrial
implementation, Qualcomm Krait processors [26] feature
small, single-cycle L0 caches. Similarly, many Arm proces-
sors use small microTLBs close to the core to achieve high
performance even with physically-mapped L1 caches [6].
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to mitigate
speculative side-channel exploits between domains at low
overheads in hardware, without removing speculation, by
adding speculative filter caches to store vulnerable state. In
fact, MuonTrap can improve performance compared to an
unmodified system: for the Parsec benchmark suite, perfor-
mance is improved by 5%, while SPEC CPU2006 is reduced
by only 4%. The modifications we have described to conven-
tional systems to protect against Spectre [27] and its deriva-
tives are simple to add to conventional systems, and provide
strong performance and wide coverage.
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